The Seven Weeks' War Read online

  On the other hand, the emperor of the French having once expressed his readiness to purchase Luxemburg, could not withdraw, at the mere dictate of Prussia, without grievously wounding the sensitive pride of the French people, and raising into a storm the national jealousy of Prussia, which had been hardly concealed since the Battle of Königgrätz. Thus rulers seemed about to be forced into a war, which neither desired, by the populations over which they ruled; and this fact may well be considered by that hysterical school of politicians which maintains that wars are the work of rulers, and that in Republican institutions lies the best guarantee of enduring peace. To ward off the danger of war a conference was arranged. It was proposed by the King of Holland, sanctioned by the neutral powers, and met in London under the presidency of Lord Stanley, who was then the Minister for Foreign Affairs. As the result of its deliberations the duchy was declared neutral, and its neutrality guaranteed by all the powers represented at the conference. Prussia withdrew her garrison from the fortress, and the fortifications were to be demolished. The concessions on the part of Prussia were not very material, as the fortifications had been erected prior to the introduction of rifled ordnance, and the great strength of the fortress lies in its natural position. Still war was for the moment averted, and many men believed that all difficulties were arranged between these two powers, that Austria was crippled, Russia unprepared, and that a lasting peace was really about to dawn upon Europe.

  Those who looked below the surface could, however, perceive that France was but brooding over the insult which she chose to conceive had been offered to her, by the fact that Germany had shaken off her leading-strings, and that Germans chose to manage their own affairs without foreign interference. Those could also see that, in the apparent calm, not only was France pushing forward armaments and military organisation, but that Prussian administrators were quietly taking all necessary precautions in case of war, and studiously followed move with move. The war, which had been for long foreseen by these, broke out indeed suddenly, and surprised the world at large; but a few men in England had carefully watched how, in the spring of 1870, French agents were engaged in all our southern markets buying corn and forage. The excuses given for enormous purchases of this description were, that the season had been so dry in France that no harvest was expected; but this excuse was transparent, for had forage been so very scarce in France, French dealers would not have cared, simultaneously with an enormous rise in the price of forage, to have largely exported horses to France.

  At the same time, too, a flotilla was secretly collected in the northern French ports capable of transporting 40,000 men and 12,000 horses. These things were, perhaps, known to and noticed by Prussian agents, but the British Government, against which the arrangements might have been equally directed, remained in a happy ignorance of any danger of war, and on the outbreak of hostilities, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, in his place in Parliament, stated that a few hours previously the British Foreign Office believed that there was not a cloud on the political horizon of Europe. Yet still, many Utopian Englishmen, in the face of these facts, contentedly argue that no preparations for the invasion of our country could be made without the government being fully aware of them.

  During the years between the treaty of Prague and the outbreak of war with France, the Prussian military organisation had been extended to the troops of all the Northern States. The Prussian Army, which fought in 1866, was increased by three corps d’armée. Of these the 9th was that of Schleswig-Holstein, the 10th that of Hanover, the 11th that of Hesse. The Grand Ducal Hessian, or 25th division, was placed in intimate connection with the last corps, while the semi-independent army of the kingdom of Saxony formed the 12th corps of the Confederation. The broad principles of the Prussian organisation, as far as regarded infantry, were proved so satisfactory in 1866, that they were extended after the Austrian war without alteration to the new corps d’armée. In the organisation of the cavalry, however, which was largely increased, the experience of 1866 dictated the necessity of a vital change. Hitherto the Prussian regiments of cavalry had always consisted of four squadrons in time of peace; on the outbreak of war the four squadrons took the field, and a depôt was formed to supply the necessary reinforcements of men and horses.

  This system was found decidedly faulty during the Austrian war, and after the treaty of Prague the Prussian regiments were increased to five squadrons, of which four take the field, and one remains as a depôt to supply immediately the quick necessities of horses and men. To this change, and to the large increase of cavalry, is due, in no slight degree, the wonderful successes of the Prussian armies in 1870—71; for, as the emperor of the French himself stated, the Prussian cavalry formed an impenetrable screen, through which it was impossible for the enemy to discover the movements of the main armies, while every movement of the French armies was accurately and faithfully reported by the now famous Uhlans to the Prussian headquarters. In the important arm artillery, the Prussians, directly after the campaign of 1866, laid aside all muzzle-loading guns and adopted for their whole field-artillery breech-loading steel pieces made on Krupp’s system.

  Towards the end of 1869 some breech-loading bronze guns were turned out, took part in the subsequent war, and were so satisfactory that it is probable the whole field-artillery will be armed with bronze guns. The system of Prussian Intendantur, which had given such excellent earnest of efficiency in 1866, was naturally extended to the newly-formed corps d’armée. The Intendantur of Prussia must be clearly distinguished from the Intendance of France; the names are similar, but the systems are almost reverse: the Prussian system was proved excellent in two great wars, the French was paralysed under the first pressure of active service. It is fortunate that our country has adopted much more the Prussian than the French system of supply in the lately established department of Control.

  When the French Empire was threatened with war on account of the Luxemburg question in 1867, the nominal strength of the army was 600,000 men; but it was found that it would have been impossible, after providing for depôts and necessary detachments, to place much more than 150,000 men in line of battle. It was evident that the military system required reorganisation, and in 1868 the system of reorganisation elaborated by Marshal Niel became law. By this new system, which was, as its predecessor, based upon conscription, the forces of the empire were divided into three classes; the active army, the reserve, and the National Guard. The service under the colours was fixed at five years, after which the soldier was to enter the reserve for four years more. Young men who were not drawn for the active army were to serve four years in the reserve and five in the National Guard.

  This system was inferior to the Prussian, because part of the reserve were not trained at all in the regular army, and the service in the ranks being five years instead of three, a smaller force of trained men could be annually passed into the reserve. Another distinction of great importance existed between the two military systems. In Prussia no man required for military service could purchase a substitute; in France any one liable to military service, by payment to the State of a sum of 2500 francs, was exempted, and the State undertook with the money so paid to replace him by another soldier. It is doubtful, however, whether the fund thus created was judiciously administered, and it is believed that the real strength of the French battalions was considerably inferior to the paper strength on the outbreak of the war. Nor was the system as laid down literally carried out, for it was objectionable to the people, and in such an excitable and feverish population, it was not advisable to train the National Guard to a perfect knowledge of weapons and drill.

  The result was, that although the reorganisation of 1868 theoretically placed more than 800,000 combatants at the disposal of the emperor, and raised the military forces of France to more than 1,200,000 men, (Active Army, 400,000 men; Reserve, 430,000 men; National Guard, 408,000 men), the army fit to take the field at the commencement of the war mustered barely 400,000 soldiers. Of these 40,000 wer
e at Cherbourg, preparing to embark on the flotilla which had been collected at the northern ports; 5,000 were at Rome, 10,000 in Algeria, 35,000 in Paris and at Châlons, 10,000 at Lyons, and about 30,000 at Marseilles, Toulouse, Rochefort, L’Orient, Bordeaux, Toulon, and in hospital. The force which could be sent towards the Rhine mustered thus barely 270,000 men. It was divided into eight corps and the Guards.

  Against it there were ready to take the field on the German side, as soon as the rapid mobilisation of the army was completed, the twelve corps of the North German Confederation, mustering at least 360,000 men, and the armies of Bavaria, Würtemburg, Darmstadt, and Baden, which were under the supreme command of the King of Prussia in virtue of the separate treaties concluded after the campaign of 1866, raised the field forces of that sovereign to over 500,000 combatants. These were well sustained by an effective and organised system of depôts and reserves, administered by an elastic and proved machinery, and handled by abstemious and well-trained officers. An iron discipline knit the Prussian soldiery together, previous victories gave entire confidence in the leaders, and a high sense of duty and self-denial pervaded the ranks.

  In the French Army, on the other hand, there was much enthusiasm and great gallantry, but discipline had been allowed to lapse, the luxurious ideas which a rapid increase of wealth had fostered, pervaded some portion of the officers, while many of the others, raised from the ranks, were wanting in the high military education which alone gives to a leader the confidence of his followers, or fits him for the rapid decision and quick judgment that are every hour necessary in war. In armament the French troops were superior to the Prussians, for they were provided with the chassepot rifle, which, with the common advantage of being a breech-loading arm, was superior in range and accuracy to the needle-gun. The latter had been early adopted by the Prussian Government, which had been averse to incur the inconveniencies of a change of armament, except to secure a very clearly-defined advantage, and had apparently underrated the excellence of the chassepot.

  Still the French advantage in this respect was more than compensated for by the hurried and excited manner in which the French troops, on more than one occasion, handled their weapons. On the other hand the Prussian soldier was more suitably equipped for European war than the French. Discarding the cumbrous equipment necessary for the formation of camps, or the refinements of cooking, the Prussian troops were willing to trust during a campaign to the shelter which villages nearly always afforded in Western Europe, or, in case of necessity, to bivouac in the open air, while a small mess-tin carried by each soldier sufficed for his culinary wants.

  The French soldier, on the contrary, was weighed down with tentes d’abri, heavy cooking apparatus, and an enormous kit. These were generally useless, frequently lost, always encumbrances; but an army accustomed to African or tropical war clings pertinaciously to the idea of canvas covering, fails to realize the different conditions under which campaigns must be conducted in Europe, and shudders at the idea of an exposure in war to which every true sportsman will willingly consent for pleasure. The French Army was heavily equipped on the experience of Africa, China, and Mexico, and it suffered heavily from this cause among others in France.

  The actual declaration of war showed that, nevertheless, the men who administered the army and directed the policy of the empire, were of opinion that not only were the French forces able to cope with the Prussian in the field, but that they could be more rapidly placed upon the theatre of war.

  In September, 1868, an insurrection broke out in the kingdom of Spain, which, joined by General Prim and Marshal Serrano, quickly developed into a revolution. At the end of that month Queen Isabella fled from the country to Biarritz. At the beginning of October Marshal Serrano entered Madrid at the head of the revolutionary army, and a provisional government was established, and General Prim named commander-in-chief of the army. The provisional government, in concert with the national representatives, decided that a constitutional monarchy should be the future form of Spanish government; but there was some difficulty in finding any man eligible to become King of Spain who would accept the position, and, till such a man could be found, Marshal Serrano was elected Regent of the Kingdom, with General Prim as his prime minister.

  Several proposed monarchs had been named, but the throne remained vacant till, in the summer of 1870, General Prim, in the name of the Spanish Ministry, offered the Crown to the amiable and accomplished Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, eldest son of the reigning Prince of Hohenzollern, who had in 1849 surrendered his sovereign rights to the King of Prussia. This prince, who had married in 1861 the sister of the King of Portugal, was in his thirty-sixth year, and a Roman Catholic by religion. He accepted the offer of the Crown, subject to the approval of the Cortes, which was certain. The news of this acceptance was published in Paris on the 5th July, and the greatest excitement arose, as the nomination of Prince Leopold was there held to be the handiwork of Count von Bismarck, who contemplated to create in Spain a Prussian dependency which should threaten France from the south of the Pyrenees. French ministers declared in the Chambers that France could not tolerate such a result to negotiations which they said had been kept secret from the emperor of the French, and seemed by their expressions to have already made up their minds to war.

  It may be correctly true that the negotiations with Prince Leopold were not officially notified by the Spanish Government to the Emperor Napoleon; but it is known that the French ambassador at Madrid had known of the probable election of this Prince for many months, and that the surprise which the French Government professed on the arrival of the official intimation was at the least disingenuous, or due to the neglect of their own agent The public mind in Paris, which had been secretly for a long time eager for war with Prussia, was only too glad to seize upon the Hohenzollern question and to urge the Imperial Government to hostilities; but the King of Prussia would not involve Europe in war for the sake of a family question; and by his influence, it is said, as head of the Hohenzollern family, and through the intervention of England, the candidature of Prince Leopold for the Spanish Crown was withdrawn, first by the prince’s father, and afterwards by himself.

  The danger of war seemed averted; but the desire for war ran high at Paris, and M. Benedetti, the French ambassador at Berlin, was directed to wait upon the King of Prussia, who was then at Ems, and obtain from him a pledge that His Majesty would never at any future time accede to the candidature of the prince. This the king refused to give, as he naturally reserved to himself freedom of action under future circumstances. The French ambassador being desirous of a further interview, the king sent an aide-de-camp to tell him that he could add nothing to what he had already said, and for further discussion referred him to Count von Bismarck. M. Benedetti naturally telegraphed the result of this interview to his own government. By the French Government the result of this interview was seized upon as an insult offered by the King of Prussia to the French ambassador, although the ambassador was ignorant himself of any insult. The news was published in Paris, and the war excitement rose to frenzy. The King of Prussia, on the other hand, telegraphed to Count von Bismarck the account of the interview at Ems, who seemed quite ready to accept the French challenge, for he viewed the action of M. Benedetti as an insult to the King of Prussia; as such it was announced in Berlin. The mind of Germany was deeply incensed. (The Franco-Prussian War, edited by Captain H. M. Hozier, where full details of these various incidents will be found).

  The interview at Ems took place on the 13th July. On the morning of the 14th a cabinet council was held at St Cloud under the presidency of the emperor, and the two chambers expected a communication. None was however made; but on the 15th July a declaration was made in the Corps Législatif and Senate simultaneously of war against Prussia, which was rapturously applauded in both houses.

  The same day the King of Prussia travelling from Ems was met by the crown prince at Brandenburg. They travelled together to Berlin, where they were met
at the railway station by Herr von Thile, the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, with the telegraphed account of the speech made that day by M. Olivier, the French prime minister, in the chambers at Paris. The king, on reading the telegram, issued orders to General von Roon and General von Moltke, who had also come to receive His Majesty, that the whole army of the North German Confederation should be at once mobilised.

  These officers drove direct from the station to their offices, and that night orders for mobilisation were telegraphed to every part of the country. From the frontiers of Belgium to the Vistula, from the Baltic to the mountains of Silesia, that night the summons was sent out, and early next day the reserve and Landwehr men of Prussia were swarming to join their ranks. At the same time continuous trains of troops were hurrying towards Lorraine and Alsatia from all parts of France; troops were being conveyed from Algeria, and within a few days the French Army, available to take the field, was in the vicinity of Metz and Strasburg.

  The French Government at the outbreak of the campaign had apparently hopes that some of the States of South Germany would separate from Prussia and join with France in the war. These hopes were speedily disappointed, for the whole of the German Powers rallied round Prussia, and so perfect was the machinery of mobilisation and the railway transport of troops, that in twenty days more than 500,000 men were close down to the French frontier, and ready to advance to battle. The 7th and 8th corps were already on the frontier in a little more than ten days, and the 3rd corps was fully equipped, completed, and ready to move in eight days.