The Seven Weeks' War Read online

  Table of Contents

  Preface to the First Edition

  Prefatory Chapter

  BOOK 1

  CHAPTER 1: Introductory

  CHAPTER 2: Fruitlessness of the Gastein Convention

  CHAPTER 3: Commencement of the Preparations for War

  CHAPTER 4: Prussia’s Motion for Reform of Germanic Confederation

  CHAPTER 5: Breach of Convention of Gastein

  BOOK 2

  CHAPTER 1: First Bloodless Conflict in Holstein

  CHAPTER 2: Final Rupture Between Prussia and Austria

  CHAPTER 3: Breakup of the Germanic Confederation

  BOOK 3

  CHAPTER 1: The War Strength of Prussia

  CHAPTER 2: The War Strength of Austria

  CHAPTER 3: War Strength of the Remaining States of Germany

  CHAPTER 4: War Strength of the Kingdom of Italy

  BOOK 4

  CHAPTER 1: Prelude of the War

  CHAPTER 2: Prussian Occupation of Hanover

  CHAPTER 3: Prussian Occupation of Hesse-Cassel

  CHAPTER 4: Prussian Occupation of Saxony

  BOOK 5

  CHAPTER 1: Theatre of German War

  CHAPTER 2: Passage of the First Army through the Mountains

  CHAPTER 3: Action of Gitschin

  BOOK 6

  CHAPTER 1: Passage of the Army of Silesia Through the Mountains

  CHAPTER 2: Passage of the Right and Central Columns of the Army of Silesia through the Mountains

  CHAPTER 3: Advance of the Left Column of the Army of Silesia

  BOOK 7

  CHAPTER 1: Operations Preceding the Battle of Königgrätz

  CHAPTER 2: Battle of Königgrätz

  CHAPTER 3: Defence of Silesia

  BOOK 8

  CHAPTER 1: Operations in the Western Theatre of the German War

  CHAPTER 2: Campaign on the Maine

  CHAPTER 3: The Actions on the Maine

  CHAPTER 4: The Campaign South of the Maine

  CHAPTER 5: Occupation of Franconia by the Second Reserve Corps

  BOOK 9

  CHAPTER 1: Prussian Advance From Königgrätz to Brünn

  CHAPTER 2: Tobitschau

  CHAPTER 3: Further Advance of the Prussian Armies from Brünn to the Danube

  CHAPTER 4: The Truce

  CHAPTER 5: Peace With the South-German States

  CHAPTER 6: Formation of the North-German Confederation

  BOOK 10

  CHAPTER 1: The War in Italy

  CHAPTER 2: Naval Operations

  CHAPTER 3: Peace Between Italy and Austria

  Appendix 1

  Appendix 2

  Appendix 3

  Appendix 4

  Appendix 5

  THE SEVEN WEEKS’ WAR

  The Seven Weeks’ War

  The Austro-Prussian Conflict of 1866

  by H. M. Hozier

  First published under the title

  The Seven Weeks’War

  Leonaur is an imprint of Oakpast Ltd

  Copyright in this form © 2012 Oakpast Ltd

  ISBN: 978-1-78282-010-9 (hardcover)

  ISBN: 978-1-78282-011-6 (softcover)

  http://www.leonaur.com

  Publisher’s Notes

  The views expressed in this book are not necessarily those of the publisher.

  TO

  COLONEL EDWARD BRUCE HAMLEY, ROYAL ARTILLERY,

  LATELY PROFESSOR OF MILITARY HISTORY, STRATEGY,

  AND TACTICS AT THE STAFF COLLEGE,

  NOW COMMANDANT OF THE STAFF COLLEGE,

  THIS FAINT ATTEMPT TO CHRONICLE THE EVENTS

  OF THE GERMAN WAR OF 1866

  IS

  DEDICATED BY

  A FORMER PUPIL

  Preface to the First Edition

  The only claim to consideration that the following pages can present is that for the most part they are the product of a personal eyewitness of some of the most interesting incidents of a war which, for rapidity and decisive results, may claim an almost unrivalled position in history.

  The author has attempted to ascertain and to advance facts. His object has been impartiality, his aim truth. Criticism from one so feebly competent to criticise would have been entitled to no respect, and has therefore been avoided. A few observations occasionally introduced are the results not of original thought so much as of communication with some whose positive abilities and experience entitle their opinions to be attentively weighed.

  MAPS

  The main features of the campaign of 1866 can be easily traced in any ordinary maps of Bohemia, Saxony or Moravia. Those who wish to study the details of the war, will find the maps published by the Prussian Staff at Berlin, in 1868, most lucid and serviceable. They are to be found in any large military library, and can be consulted at the Royal United Service Institution.

  Prefatory Chapter

  The results of the war of 1866 in Germany were the aggrandizement of Prussia, the formation of new Confederations and the disappearance of Austria as a Germanic power. To the eight provinces of which Prussia consisted in the spring of 1866 were added Hesse-Cassel, Nassau, Hanover, Schleswig-Holstein and Lauenburg. These were incorporated in the Prussian kingdom and raised its population to about 23,500,000.

  At the same time arose under the leadership of Prussia the new North German Confederation, the harbinger of an united German Empire. It was sixty years almost to a day when the treaty of Prague was signed in 1866, since the Emperor Francis II. had announced to the Diet his resignation of the Imperial Crown: By that act, due to the victories of Napoleon I. over Germans, the oldest political institution in the world was extinguished, for this empire was that which the nephew of Julius won for himself from the powers of the East at the Battle of Actium, and which had preserved almost unaltered through eighteen centuries of time and through the greatest changes in extent, in power, and in character, a title and pretensions from which all meaning had long since departed. (Bryce, Holy Roman Empire).

  On the fall of Napoleon I. this empire was to a certain extent reconstituted by the treaty of Vienna as a Confederation of thirty-nine States. This Confederacy was extinguished in the war of 1866, and the treaty of Prague established the Confederation of the North German States, and led to the re-establishment of the Germanic Empire on a purer, more natural, and more homogeneous basis than it had ever possessed from the days of the Caesars. The treaty of Prague, however, was but the stepping-stone, not the key-stone of German Unity. North Germany numbering twenty-one States was indeed linked by that treaty into a close connection with Prussia, who held the undivided leadership, the command of the German armies, and the power of peace and war north of the Maine.

  South Germany did not hold itself together. Austria stood aloof, and appeared resolved henceforth to meddle no more in German affairs. Bavaria, Würtemburg, and Baden remained almost independent of each other, but each, on its own footing, concluded important treaties with Prussia. By that between Prussia and Bavaria, concluded on the 22nd August, 1866, these two powers mutually guaranteed the integrity of their respective territories with all the military forces at their disposal; and it was also established, that in case of war the King of Prussia should have the command-in-chief of the Bavarian army. The treaties between Prussia, Baden, and Würtemburg, were of the same tenure; they provided a strict military alliance and submission of the armies in time of war to the King of Prussia.

  In Northern Germany, in the spring of 1867, a representative assembly elected by universal suffrage at the rate of one member for every 100,000 of the population, met at Berlin in February, and by the 16th April, had discussed and adopted a constitutional charter by which the whole of the States of North Germany were definitively united into a federal
body. This charter, entitled the Constitution of the North German Confederation, consists of fifteen chapters, comprising seventy-nine articles, with a preamble declaring that the governments of the States enumerated, formed themselves into a perpetual Confederation for the protection of the territory and institutions of the union, and for the guardianship of the welfare of the German people.

  The twenty-one States incorporated in this Confederation were, Prussia, Saxony, Mecklenburg-Schwerin, Mecklenburg-Strelitz, Oldenburg, Brunswick, Saxe-Weimar, Saxe-Meiningen, Anhalt, Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, Saxe-Altenburg, Waldeck, Lippe-Detmold, Reuss-Schleiz, Reuss-Greiz, Schwarzburg-Sondershausen, Schwarzburg-Rudolstadt, Schaumburg-Lippe, Hamburg, Lübeck, and Bremen. The executive power of the Confederation was vested in the Sovereign of Prussia: this ruler also, as the Lord President, managed the diplomatic intercourse of the Confederation with foreign powers; was the commander-in-chief of the army and navy, and had the prerogative of nominating ambassadors, of declaring war, and of concluding peace. It was his duty to enforce the observance of federal laws, and to compel negligent or disobedient members to fulfil their federal obligations, and to appoint all officers and civil functionaries. The contributions of the various States to the cost of the general administration of the Confederation, was regulated in proportion to the numbers of their population. The King of Prussia had also to appoint a Chancellor of the Confederation who should preside over the Federal Council. The chancellor selected was naturally the Count von Bismarck.

  By the terms of the Constitution of the North German Confederation, the legislative power of the Union was vested in two representative bodies. One of these bodies is elected by the governments of the Confederate States, and is termed the Bundesrath, the other is elected by the population, and is termed the Reichstag. In the Bundesrath sit deputies from the governments of each State of the Confederation; the representative of Prussia has seventeen votes, that of Saxony four, and those from Mecklenburg-Schwerin and Brunswick two each. Besides smaller German estates and the three free-towns with one vote each. All together forty-two votes. The Reichstag is elected by universal suffrage for the term of three years and meets in annual session. To the Reichstag belongs the initiative of legislative acts; it is independent of the Bundesrath, but the members of the latter have the privilege of being present it its sittings to expose the views of their respective governments.

  On account of the representations of the Emperor of the French, Saxony was not, on the conclusion of the war of 1866, so completely absorbed into the North German Confederation as her more northern neighbours. The King of Saxony, although a member of the Union, still retained the power of nominating officers, civil and military, in his kingdom, and the Saxon Army was not merged in that of the Confederation. It was, however, to be held under the supreme orders of the King of Prussia in case of war.

  The conclusion of the war in 1866, and the treaty of Prague, were due in a great measure to the emperor of the French, whose offer to mediate between the contending powers, Austria hastily accepted, probably erroneously, as Count Bismarck had already made proposals for direct negotiations, in which no mention of the payment of a war indemnity was made. France was, however, only too eager to mediate; for French diplomatists for decades previous to 1870 held the creed, that the privilege of France was to arrange, and mould, to her own advantage, the domestic commotions of Germany. Prussia could not without folly at the close of a victorious campaign, risk all its glorious results by throwing down the gauntlet to France, and raising up on the Rhine a new army of enemies, while unfriendly divisions were still frowning on the banks of the Danube and the Maine. She was perforce obliged to consent to French mediation, and French mediation was not disinterested.

  It was the aim and object of France to oppose the unity of Germany, and to prevent the rise of a great and united nation on her own border. For this reason she stipulated for the semi-independence of Saxony, and caused a clause to be inserted in the treaty of Prague by which Prussia consented to cede to Denmark the northern portion of Schleswig. Austria, who at the time of the negotiation of the treaty of Prague was but the mouth-piece of France, stipulated when she retired from the German Confederacy, that the remaining Southern States should be formed into a Southern Confederacy. It was thus hoped to prevent the ultimate fusion of the Southern States with Northern Germany and Prussia, and to establish a power in Germany which jealousy of Prussia and the bitterness of defeat, might in an European conflict range upon the side of Prussia’s enemies.

  But the man who guided the foreign policy of Prussia was competent to foil the diplomatists of France. Confident of the difficulties which would defer the formation of the Southern Confederation, he assented to the Austro-French proposal, organised the Northern Confederation, which speedily acquired strength and consistency, and concluded between each of the Southern States individually, offensive and defensive alliances with Prussia. France, really by an attitude of desire to interfere in the internal arrangement of Germany, facilitated the conclusion of these treaties; and the fact that on the 6th August, 1866, she demanded the fortress of Mainz from Prussia under threat of war, though known but to a few men, had doubtless an important effect.

  The cession of the fortress was refused, and when it was seen that Prussia was resolute the threat was not carried out, but an excuse made, which averred that the demand was wrung from the emperor when labouring under illness. The French Army was then far from prepared for war, as it was not thoroughly completed with men, nor armed with a breech-loading weapon; and France failed to obtain after the war of 1866, territorial concessions from Germany, as signally as when before that war she proffered to declare against Austria, and attack her with 300,000 men, provided that Prussia would cede territory on the left bank of the Rhine.

  While after the campaign of 1866 the North German Confederation almost daily increased in power and united sentiment, no progress was made in the formation of a Southern Bund. The States lying south of the Maine were too equal in size and resources. None was clearly preeminent, and to none would the others consent to accord pre-eminence.

  An attempt was made at a conference held at Nördlingen in 1868, to form an agreement among the Southern States as to a very minor question,—the management of the federal fortresses of the South: yet even on this subject there was no concord, and the conference separated with the sole result of showing that it was almost impossible on any point to establish an harmonious understanding between the States of Southern Germany. At first, however, the relations between these States and Prussia were not quite satisfactory, for there were political parties who feared the preponderance of Prussia, and the probable absorption of the Southern States, but the attitude of France gradually forced the clear-sighted patriotism of the South to regard Prussia with friendly eyes, and the deep-seated desire of German unity swayed all except a few selfish and protectionist factions. Austria at first seemed inclined to harbour a desire of vengeance for the defeat of 1866, and to look upon France as a probable future ally.

  But the publication of the fact that France had been willing to declare against her at the outbreak of the German war, did much to modify that feeling, and to turn her population, as well as her government, to the necessary task of internal, financial, and military reorganisation. The Prussian victories in 1866 were at the time looked upon in France with jealousy and disfavour. The crowning triumph of Königgrätz was regarded by the excitable population of that empire as a direct step towards German unity, the aggrandizement of Prussia, and consequently as a menace to the ascendancy and control which for years the French had tacitly claimed in the internal affairs of Germany. In 1866 the claims of France to German territory were withdrawn; but in 1867 they were renewed in a form which, although less summary, still for a short time, threatened to disturb the peace of Europe. By the treaty of Vienna in 1815, the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg was given to the King of the Belgians, but at the same time was included in the Germanic Confederation.

  On the separati
on of Belgium from the Netherlands, it was arranged by the treaty of London that Eastern Luxemburg and Limburg, to which the federal obligations of Western Luxemburg were transferred, should be handed over to the King of the Netherlands, while the King of the Belgians received full sovereignty over the western portion of Luxemburg. The King of the Netherlands refused to accede to this treaty, but after the French siege of Antwerp, Austria and Prussia, in behalf of the Germanic Confederation, enforced the provisions of the treaty, and the eastern portion of Luxemburg was formally included in the confederation. The town of Luxemburg was a most important fortress of Germany towards France, and from 1815 to 1867 was garrisoned by a Prussian garrison. In 1867, the King of Holland, Sovereign of Luxemburg, who had been excluded from the North German Confederation on its formation in 1866, made overtures for the sale of the fortress and territory, to France. To these the Emperor Napoleon lent a willing ear.

  The arrangement soon became publicly known, and war between France and Prussia for the moment seemed imminent. The public feeling of Germany was allowed to become excited, although, had the leaders of Prussia desired, it is almost certain, that at the beginning of the complication, they could have yielded Luxemburg to France without being forced into war by the pressure of public opinion. Such was not, however, their desire; war with France was the readiest mode of completing German unity; and although Count von Bismark did not push forward such a war, he did not shrink from taking up the gauntlet if it were thrown down to him. He accordingly refused to abandon the defence of a fortress which had been confided to the guardianship of Prussia for half a century, and which was really situated on German ground, although not formally included in the North German Confederation. Some day the real history of the exclusion of Luxemburg from that confederation in 1866 may be known.